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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines whether foreign acquisitions of Chinese firms improve share-price 
performance relative to domestic acquisitions, controlling for firm size and target industry. 
The results show that foreign acquisitions do not enjoy positive short-run market reactions 
but do realize significant long-run profits when the acquiring firm is large. Additionally, 
addressing anecdotal evidence, while resource-related acquisitions generate significant gains 
in the short-run, driven mainly by domestic deals, significant reversals are found long-term. 
International investment is shown to be on an upward trend for China and can be lucrative for 
large organizations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
China has catapulted onto the global socio-economic landscape at a rapid pace in recent 
times. Globalization and financial market integration has led China to become a central and 
integral part of the world’s economic landscape, igniting a plethora of political concerns. 
Zhou et al. (2012) show that the Chinese government has increasingly sought to recommend 
firms to acquire foreign targets with menacing alacrity so as to boost both the technological 
advancement and subsequent economic growth of this emerging economy. However, instead 
of the oft-eulogized invisible hand of Adam Smith, Chinese firms are facing a multitude of 
diverse international hands, each actively trying to block completion of Chinese foreign 
acquisitions. This protectionist display against Chinese acquirers arguably heightens the 
importance that these firms display unfaltering judgment throughout the selection, acquisition 
and integration process in pursuit of their chosen target. The relevant literature is scarce while 
the wider existing work related to mergers and acquisitions in general is virtually redundant 
when faced with the unique idiosyncrasies regarding the performance of Chinese firms 
engaged in foreign acquisitions relative to domestic ones. We aim to fill this gap by 
examining the short-term market reaction to the merger announcements of Chinese acquirers 
as well as their long-term post-merger share price performance, stratifying the sample 
according to whether the target is domestic or foreign. 
 
Since the economic reform of 1978, China has cultivated a high economic growth rate to 
become the world’s second-largest economy, valued at a staggering £5.8 trillion (Flanders, 
2011). During this time, domestic companies such as Lenovo have grown substantially, 
moving into the international arena to compete with dominant Western brands such as 
Hewlett-Packard (Dietz, Orr and Xing, 2008). In 2011, foreign investment via merger activity 
rose by 96% when backed by private-equity, valued at $12.3 billion, increasing from the $6.3 
billion spent during 2010 (Private Equity Asia, 2012).  
 
However, the internationalization of Chinese firms has been no easy feat. Foreign 
acquisitions have exacerbated Western apprehension regarding the exchange of corporate 
control to the East particularly given the mainstream identity of targeted major international 
Western brands, such as IBM (Private Equity Asia, 2012) and Volvo (China Business News, 
2012). Political radars have honed in on foreign acquisitions involving the People’s Republic 
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of China
1
, particularly given that many involve the purchase of targets within the energy, 
industrials or technological sectors (The Economist, 2011-12) whereby growing demand and 
diminishing resources is heightening the implications of economic scarcity. As an example, 
the office of President Obama in the US has openly criticized trade practices with China. 
Indeed, the New York Times reported that the Obama administration has recommended that 
the Committee on Foreign Investment into the US should ‘block any mergers and 
acquisitions involving the Chinese companies and American businesses’ due to national 
security concerns (Schmidt et al. in New York Times, 2012).  
 
While Chinese foreign acquisitions have led to a stream of journalistic articles (within The 
Economist, Financial Times and so forth), there have been few academic studies that have 
specifically examined Chinese acquisitions on a national versus international basis since 
2000, with most research pertaining to the US (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003) or the EU (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). The historically insular Chinese 
economy has in fact only recently been popularized despite China exhibiting unique 
characteristics worthy of academic investigation for a number of decades. Some of these key 
characteristics are related to the level of state involvement and resultant political 
connectedness in the corporate decision-making process (see Gao and Kling, 2007; Xu et al., 
2011; Wu et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012). While many papers focus on the unique political 
structure and its ramifications upon traditional firm performance measures, none to our 
knowledge has investigated the financial performance of bidders that acquire domestically 
versus those which decide acquire abroad.  
 
Despite China receiving little attention in this field, there exists a plethora of literature which 
have centered on traditional US and EU datasets examining the value of firms acquiring 
abroad. The premise lies in whether or not investors place a premium upon international 
firms relative to domestic ones given the benefits of diversification within a multinational 
framework. In seminal work from the eighties, Doukas and Travlos (1988) argued that the 
primary motive for firm’s going abroad ‘lies in the flexibility to transfer resources across 
borders through a globally maximizing network’ (Doukas and Travlos, 1988: 1161). In this 
sense, multinational firms can earn a price premium via offering investors an ability to 
                                                          
1 For example, Swedish government officials strongly opposed the sale of Volvo to the Chinese car manufacturer 
Geely under the fear of the potential outflow of intellectual property to the East, resulting in the deal being 
referred to the European Commission on anti-trust grounds (Breaking News, 2010). 
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sidestep institutional restrictions and information externalities. Thus the acquisition of a 
foreign target can act as an information signal to the market regarding the firm’s intention to 
a) expand globally and b) act to directly exploit capital market distortions. The study finds 
that multinational corporations from the US that do not operate in the country and/or industry 
of the target before the acquisition earn the most positive and significant gains, supporting the 
premise of indirect global diversification benefits.  
 
In related work, Morck and Yeung (1991) suggest that cross-border acquisitions can offer 
firms an ability to enhance their value through the expansion of its operations abroad, 
specifically for those that possess valuable intangible assets (i.e. superior production skills, 
patents, marketing abilities, consumer goodwill and so forth), termed the internalization 
theory. Their results indicate support for the positive effects of valuable intangibles when 
acquiring abroad. Moreover, given the increasing trend for internationalization of emerging 
market firms, the reverse internalization hypothesis argues that it is the ability to acquire 
valuable intangible assets such as knowledge that could help explain the decision to buy 
abroad for BRIC organizations (Gubbi et al., 2010).  
 
There are clear opportunities to contribute to, as well as to update, this seminal existing 
literature. It is of growing importance for China and the rest of the world to gain a deeper 
understanding of the financial performance of foreign acquisitions given the predictions that 
the future landscape of the global economy is set to become predominantly Chinese (Jacques, 
2012). This would help to assess whether such investments are economically worthwhile for 
the Chinese economy that aims to foster continued high-level growth and development. 
Furthermore, it will also help to shed clarity upon Western concerns regarding the motivation 
of the Chinese bidder given economic scarcity, as evidenced with the stance of President 
Obama’s office regarding US national security implications. Secondly, there are limited 
studies on offer that fully assess Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in terms of mergers 
and target characteristics. No study, to the best of our knowledge, has cross-examined the 
positive multinational network hypothesis of Doukas and Travlos (1988) relative to both the 
internationalization hypothesis of Morck and Yeung (1991) and the adjusted reverse 
internalization hypothesis (Gubbi et al., 2010) using a Chinese dataset.  
 
With this in mind, we focus upon China and separate our sample of acquisitions by target 
nation in terms of whether the firm is located in mainland China (‘Domestic’) or not 
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(‘Foreign’). Using a comprehensive sample, we examine short-run announcement returns for 
bidders using a three-day event window as well as the long-term share-price performance, 
utilizing buy-and-hold (BHAR) methodology for a twenty-four month holding period with 
bootstrapped t-statistics so as to control for the possible skewness effect (see Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). Additionally, we adjust our analysis to control for the size of the bidder under 
the advocacy of Fama and French (1992). Secondly, we also investigate the performance of 
bidders stratified by the industry of the target to examine both the volume of deals within 
certain sectors as well as the profits being extracted.  
 
The short-term results indicate that domestic transactions generate 2.76% (0.000) significant 
announcement returns - these positive returns hold regardless of the method of payment used 
- while foreign acquisitions lose -0.58% (0.604), statistically insignificant at any conventional 
level. Moreover, domestic acquirers statistically outperform cross-border ones by 2.45% 
(0.006). Additionally, the short-term analysis reveals that Chinese bidders earn significant 
abnormal returns when purchasing within the energy, industrials and materials sectors. 
However, these profits are confined to domestic transactions and thus Western political 
reactions regarding the supposed loss of economic resources towards the Far East are shown 
to be unfounded.  
 
Over the long-term period, we find that domestic acquirers generate statistically significant 
losses of -7.98% (0.023) while foreign acquisitions generate insignificant returns of 14.20% 
(0.656) on the aggregate. However, when we control for firm-size, we find that there is a 
significantly positive long-run over-performance of 29.81% (0.006) for large foreign 
acquisitions benchmarked against domestic ones while large foreign acquisitions earn 
22.39% (0.014) at the aggregate. This result suggests that there is a financial benefit for 
Chinese acquirers of going abroad so long as the firm is large enough to compete on the 
global market, consistent with the implications of reverse internalization whereby foreign 
acquisitions are enhancing the competitiveness of Chinese firms within the global economy.   
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several key ways. Firstly, this is the first 
paper to our knowledge that empirically examines a comprehensive Chinese merger dataset 
in order to ascertain the contrasting market reaction to the announcement of domestic versus 
foreign transactions. Secondly, after controlling for firm size, we find large foreign 
acquisitions can generate significant long-term value for Chinese bidders. Finally, this work 
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shows that there has been a significant increase in the volume of cross-border investment via 
M&A activity emanating from China, with consolidation of key sectors such as energy and 
high-technology, indicating potential for a continued upward volume of transactions.  
 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature; Section 3 outlines 
the data and methodological approach; Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical 
analysis; and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with ideas for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Emergence of China 
 
By 2010, China had emerged to become the world’s second largest economy overtaking 
Japan, despite still being a developing nation (Tenders Info, 2010). Simultaneously, 
promotion of foreign investment by the People’s Republic of China has significantly 
influenced the expansion and restructuring of the domestic economy since the nineties, with 
the economic value and trading volume of M&A deals increasing year-on-year (Morck, 
Yeung and Zhao, 2008).  
 
There have been a number of political reforms that have vastly shaped the Chinese economy, 
which serve as a foundation for the motivation of this work. In particular, the state 
implemented the “Go-Out” (sometimes termed “Go Global” policy) in 1999 to promote 
foreign acquisition activity, overseas investment and co-development agreements with 
foreign firms (Ma and Hurd, 2005). This policy has endured multiple reforms over the years 
as the state aims to refine a success strategy for international investment. Additionally, in 
2001, the government set aside $500 billion for overseas investments to be undertaken over a 
five-year period, directed at specific sectors, such as energy to acquire supplies of oil and gas 
(Ma and Hurd, 2005). Chinese firms should, under the new policy, seek to acquire targets 
abroad in order to attain access to better technology and overseas capital markets while also 
further developing the domestic economy. 
 
 [Insert Figure 1] 
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Figure 1 reports the twelve-month moving average for the acquirer’s three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns from 2000 until 2009 and it can be seen that there is a spike around the 
2002 Act of Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed Companies followed by a dip given the 
economic crash experienced in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2003. 
Additionally, following the RMB exchange-rate reform of 21
st
 June 2005, further reinforcing 
the 1999 “Go Global” policy, firm acquisition performance experienced a marked 
improvement reaching a peak up to 2.5%. Chinese acquisitions are certainly improving over 
time in terms of executing financially rewarding transactions.  
 
2.2. Existing Literature 
 
Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008) highlight the importance of addressing the idiosyncrasies of 
the Chinese market. Using a dataset of 1,381 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges, they document that over half of these firms are directly owned by the state 
while the remainder are ultimately controlled by the government through state-managed 
investment funds and state controlled enterprises. This characteristic makes Chinese firms 
completely different from the usual type of bidders typically seen in the US or the EU.  
 
Given the governmental involvement in the economy within China, not only in its actual 
dynamics but through the ownership and control it exerts over the key economic players, it is 
not surprising that the government’s “Go Global” policy has triggered a steady upward rise in 
the level of foreign acquisitions undertaken. Focussing on the motivation and performance of 
companies that acquire foreign targets, Doukas and Travlos (1988) posited that such a 
decision could signal to the market the firm’s intention to exploit capital market distortions, 
particularly via arbitrage activity of institutional restrictions, capturing of informational 
externalities or indeed via capitalization of economies on a global scale. Their work sought to 
ascertain whether firms could meet an international diversification objective via a 
multinational network that can offer systematic advantages. The results showed that the value 
is limited if capital markets are integrated and indeed when the home market of the acquirer 
is efficient. Positive and significant returns for multinational firms acquiring a firm in an 
economy in which the firm currently did not operate proved support for the propositions of 
the positive multinational network hypothesis
2
. Indeed, given that the domestic Chinese 
                                                          
2 Doukas and Travlos (1988) found strong returns for a bidder following the completion of an acquisition in which the target 
company is located within a country in which the bidder has not previously operated within. We tried to include a similar 
8 
 
market could be considered to have not fully integrated into the global economy, such that 
therefore it possesses particular distortions such as the political censorship of information, 
going abroad at the firm-level could offer a way for domestic investors to globally diversify 
their position indirectly and exploit the faced capital market distortions.  
 
Morck and Yeung (1991), taking inspiration from Doukas and Travlos (1988), examined 
three further key hypotheses regarding why firms move from a uninational to multinational 
operation centered upon US firms. They firstly theorize that direct foreign investment occurs 
at times in which the firm itself is set to be able to extract value from global expansion of its 
valuable intangible assets, which includes factors such as patents, marketing abilities and so 
forth. The value of these intangible assets is theorized to be directly proportional to the 
degree of multinationality of the firm, labeled the internalization hypothesis. The second 
argument is centered upon foreign acquisitions being a solution for managers seeking the 
confines of the complex structure of a multinational firm to avoid agency monitoring. Finally, 
the paper offers that multinationality can offer firms a way to avoid taxation laws and 
potentially to the ability to source low-cost inputs. The results mainly support the 
internalization theory, and in fact, little support is found for the other hypotheses discussed.  
 
Updating this seminal work, Gubbi et al. (2010) examine the Indian market. They emphasize 
that the scope of previous studies is somewhat limited due to the previous ‘norm’ whereby 
bidders typically originated within developed economies, acquiring those located in less 
developed countries. The crises engulfing Western nations undoubtedly offers an opportunity 
to examine the consequences and performance of the reverse situation – whereby an 
emerging market, fuelled by high foreign reserves and appreciating currencies, homes the 
initiating party. Gubbi et al. (2010) assess the value of the reverse internalization hypothesis, 
whereby the bidder acquires to buy the intangible assets of the target, rather than acquiring to 
spread the value of their own. Arguably this is a necessary update given that it is the 
intangibles of technology, patents, knowledge and other valuable resources that are held by 
the targets that are required to both project and enhance the competitiveness of domestic 
firms within the global economy, as well as to further propel the mainland’s ongoing 
economic development.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dummy into our analysis but there were only 24 deals that represented the first move of the bidder into the target’s nation. 
The results of this analysis were insignificant, most probably due to the small sample, and so we could not reliably report the 
results. It does however serve as an opportunity for further research as Chinese FDI continues to increase year-on-year.  
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In a related study, Changqi and Ningling (2010) try to assess the true determinants of China’s 
FDI. They hypothesize that a better pre-acquisition performance should produce better cross-
border financial rewards in line with the Q-theory of mergers. A well-managed firm should 
enjoy a steady or upward stock price and thus those with better pre-merger performance 
should be those deemed to be well-managed firms that can transfer their superior leadership 
to the target. Moreover, because of state-ownership, many Chinese companies do not pay out 
dividends in order to keep control of the firms’ funds (Changqi and Ningling, 2010; Morck, 
Yeung and Yu, 2008; Chen and Young, 2010; Sun and Tong, 2003). Although legislation has 
been established forcing firms to pay out a minimum of 20%, many would still opt to retain 
all earnings given the choice in order to preserve control. State-ownership can mean a lack of 
transparency between managerial decisions and the firm’s shareholders (Wei, Xie and Zhang, 
2005). This informational asymmetry can lead to negative announcement returns for firms 
engaging in foreign acquisitions. Shareholders are modeled as reacting to the governmental 
decision to direct such action, rather than to the quality of the deal itself. Changqi and 
Ningling (2010) also stress that an older firm will have more experience and thus there 
should be a positive relation between a firm’s age and foreign acquisition returns, which may 
also explain the degree of influence that can be exerted by the state.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
 
Chinese foreign investments have amassed growing media coverage in the developed world 
(The Economist, 2011-12). A paradigm shift of power is invoking much interdisciplinary 
attention, specifically marrying together politics with finance (Jacques, 2012). Yet despite the 
mass of anecdotal evidence, there have been few empirical studies that have specifically 
focused upon Chinese FDI.  
 
While many papers have focused on China’s unique political structure (Gao and Kling, 2009; 
Xu et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012), none to our knowledge has investigated 
the financial performance of domestic acquisitions relative to foreign ones. China has been 
documented as having an increasing trend in both the level and scale of acquisitions. We’ve 
now had over ten years of acquisitions abroad and China has become an ideal testing ground 
for updating and refining the evidence regarding the value of multinationality. As the world’s 
future superpower (Jacques, 2012), in-depth analysis is warranted both politically and 
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economically for China itself, as well as for those starting to begin to understand this 
traditionally opaque economy.  
 
We focus our first hypothesis therefore upon the financial performance of domestic 
acquisitions relative to foreign ones to shed new light on the multinationality vs. 
uninationality debate. The seminal paper of Doukas and Travlos (1988: 1161) theorizes that 
multinational corporations can earn a stock price premium through the unique selling point of 
being able to transfer firms’ resources on an international scale through a globally 
maximizing network. The study found supportive evidence of firms moving abroad, 
specifically into a “new” market whereby a firm that did not have any previous operations in 
that country was shown to be able to exploit profits from this new global exposure. 
Multinational corporations therefore advance their shareholders profits’ when they move into 
a new market, via diversification of the proposition of the firm, as well as indirectly the 
portfolios of the investors that hold the firm’s stock. This theory, denoted the positive 
multinational network hypothesis, promotes multinationality as a vehicle through which 
investors can diversify their positions, that individually they would be restricted from doing 
due to capital market distortions. Contextually, this appears particularly appropriate for 
Chinese investors that suffer from controlled currency flows, restricted and censored media 
as well as limited understanding of foreign economies.   
 
Morck and Yeung (1991) furthered this work by critically evaluating three further motives 
for moving abroad – tax avoidance and low-cost inputs, managerial objectives and 
internalization. The internalization hypothesis conceives that FDI occurs at times when the 
multinational corporation possesses valuable intangible assets that it can enhance in value 
through international expansion of its operations. The ability to be able to control foreign 
operations should allow for profits, which will be theoretically limited only by the potential 
costs of managing the foreign subsidiary.  
 
In a contemporary study using Indian data, Gubbi et al. (2010) emphasize that the 
internalization hypothesis can and should be updated to allow for the concept of inorganic 
growth via M&A activity – that is, for developing nations to leapfrog the conventional path 
of economic development via the foreign acquisition of both tangible and intangible assets. 
The acquisition of intangible knowledge, that would require time and patience to be grown 
organically, can be a lucrative strategic opportunity for emerging markets.  
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Applying this evidence to China it would anecdotally appear that such arguments have 
substance. The characteristics of the Chinese state documented are such that foreign 
acquisitions present a unique opportunity to shed additional light on the existing literary 
debate. With this in mind, we are led to the first testable proposition: 
 
H1: Foreign acquisitions generate positive abnormal returns for Chinese firms. 
 
Target selection is debatably the most important decision in the M&A process. Finding a 
target that can strategically enhance bidder value is imperative to ensure sufficient financial 
synergy both exists and can be extracted. An integral part of the motivation to move abroad, 
the industry and size of the target relative to the bidder could prove an important explanatory 
determinant of firm performance. Boateng et al. (2008) decompose the strategic motivation of 
Chinese acquirers within a sample of 27 foreign transactions that took place over the period 
2000 to 2004. They find that foreign acquisitions tend to be economically motivated such that 
value is created through diversification, acquisition of foreign technology and faster entry 
into new economies. In related work, Gu and Reed (2010) explore the market reaction to 145 
overseas M&As over a fourteen-year period from 1994 to 2008. Their work specifically 
focuses only on the effects of the “Go Global” policy of 1999 and finds supportive evidence 
that the market responds positively towards the announcement of M&As. They reason that 
the “Go Global” policy has allowed for domestic Chinese enterprises to seek profit-
improving transactions, while they also note that the cross-border investment itself has 
directed more of China’s wealth towards profitable industries such as resource and 
technology. Conn et al. (2005) also report that foreign acquisitions of high-tech firms can 
extract merger profits due to the inherent synergy of effectively acquiring knowledge driving 
firm innovation.  
 
The reverse internalization hypothesis posits that it is the very resources that the target offers 
relative to what the bidder possesses that motivates the firm to conduct a foreign acquisition. 
Spreading the operations of the company onto the international arena can be lucrative if there 
is an opportunity for the firm to strategically position itself in such a way that will propel the 
competitiveness of the product offering. Given the anecdotal media coverage of Chinese 
acquisitions (i.e. Lenovo-IBM; Geely-Volvo), it does appear that targets in resource-related 
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industries are particularly important from a political and economic standpoint (Gubbi et al., 
2010). Given this evidence, we are led to our second testable proposition: 
 
H2: Foreign acquisitions of targets located in resource-related industries (e.g. energy, 
industrials, technology) will provide higher positive abnormal returns than those in other 
industries. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Dataset 
 
We compile our Chinese merger dataset from Thomson One Banker SDC with share price 
and accounting information sourced from Thomson DataStream. Information related to 
specific deal characteristics (such as firm names, target nation, and so forth) are taken from 
Thomson One Banker SDC. The sample period studied is 01/01/2000-31/12/2009 due to the 
limited number of cross-border deals prior to the encouragement of the People’s Republic of 
China in the “Go Global” policy of 1999. Furthermore, our sample ends in 2009 for the 
requirement of the availability of data in the long-run post-merger performance.  
 
For a deal to be included in our sample, we required that it meet the following criteria: 
 
 The acquirer must be listed on a Chinese stock exchange – either Shenzhen or Shanghai – 
with a valid DataStream code such that public financial information can be sourced. 
 The deal must take place between 01/01/2000 and 31/12/2009. 
 The deal must have a deal value greater than $1 million to account for the relative size 
effect (Asquith et al., 1983).  
 
The initial total sample size of the dataset satisfying these criteria is 1,400 deals. Due to a 
lack of data related to market value (MV), market-to-book value (MTBV) and payment 
method of the deals, 942 deals were removed such that the final sample size is comprised of 
458 deals.  
 
The focus of this paper is placed upon the performance of foreign acquirers relative to 
domestic ones. We therefore split our sample into two sub-groups – one in which the target 
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was domiciled outside of the Chinese stock market, and one where the target was domiciled 
in China. This splits the sample into 4,15 domestic Chinese deals and 43 cross-border ones.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the time distribution of deals for the final sample by year and deal 
value. We can see that there is a gradual increasing trend for the number of M&As completed 
since 2000 for both categories. In particular, following China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001, international expansions have become increasingly popular. 
Politically, the People’s Republic of China has been encouraging Chinese investment abroad 
(Gartland, 2012) and this is shown to have grown by 500% from the period 2001 to 2010.  
 
While the volume of these transactions is undoubtedly low as compared to perhaps a more 
developed M&A market such as the US, the economic value of these transactions is 
significant. The time distribution in our sample by deal value indicates that in 2001, 
international Chinese M&As were valued at $0.021 billion. By 2008 this had increased to an 
astonishing $5.054 billion
3 . Additionally, within 2008, the People’s Republic of China 
introduced further regulation for overseas acquisitions within the financial sector as a result 
of the sub-prime crisis that had begun to cripple to global economy, to ensure this money is 
well spent abroad. This regulation defines that any ownership of 20% or more within a 
foreign institution by a Chinese company should be classified as a “significant holding” while 
it was also specified that Chinese overseas acquirers would be restricted from buying into any 
foreign company that had suffered either significant losses or a low employee retention ratio 
(Comtex News Network, 2008). It is clear that China is focused on trying to develop a 
success strategy for overseas M&A’s to contribute to, and not detract from, the development 
of the Chinese domestic economy.  
 
The political encouragement to invest abroad is undoubtedly seeping into the investment 
decisions of Chinese firms. While it is evident that cross-border deals are a key initiative of 
the government, domestic deals are also on the rise. Panel A of Table 1 indicates a significant 
increase in the volume and value of domestic M&As as well, particularly since the creation of 
                                                          
3 Comtex News Network documented that by September of 2008, foreign M&As had surged by 49.8% overall totaling more 
than $17.6 billion. Due to the availability of data and non-listing of some of these acquirers, we can’t include all within the 
sample studied within this paper. Nevertheless, leading banks such as Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of 
Communications and Guangdong Development Bank were shown to be conducting some of the more significant deals.  
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the 25-member M&A committee in 2008, solely tasked with ensuring that any merger, 
acquisition or restructuring plan is examined intensely so as to provide support for listed 
companies that decide to consolidate their assets domestically with similar firms (Agence 
France Presse, 2008). The target nation is shown in Panel B of Table 1 to largely be within 
Hong Kong, which accounts for circa 50% of the foreign sample. This is unsurprising given 
the conveyance of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.  
 
Media coverage and existing literature from the Western world (Gu and Reed, 2010; Boateng 
et al., 2008) regarding Chinese acquisitions has noted acquirer’s sector preferences. Panel C 
of Table 1 reports the time distribution of targets stratified by industry. It can be seen that 
there is a strong preference for targets to be listed in resource-related sectors, particularly in 
the foreign sample. Domestic acquirers appear to acquire firms within the industrials, 
materials and hi-tech sectors. This is also true for foreign acquisitions. Anecdotal evidence 
has covered the debate between China’s transactions moving control of scarce resources 
towards the East. Our evidence supports that there is a preference for targets within resource-
related sectors for both domestic and foreign transactions.  
 
While the People’s Republic of China has taken numerous measures to encourage M&A 
activity, be it domestically or internationally, the question remains whether or not these deals 
are generating value for the acquiring firms. This paper fills this void and the methodological 
approaches followed are now presented. 
 
3.2. Methodological Approaches 
 
This paper investigates the performance of domestic and foreign acquisitions undertaken by 
listed firms in China. As outlined in the previous section, the full sample is split into two sub-
samples – one that includes acquisitions of domestic Chinese targets (‘Domestic’) and the 
other that includes acquisitions of foreign targets (‘Foreign’).  
 
In addition, we note the abundant literature that highlights the need to control for the size of 
the acquirer (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). For this reason, we create secondary 
portfolios stratifying each sub-sample according to acquirer size, as measured by the firm’s 
MV two months prior to the acquisition. The firms are then sorted according to their size, 
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where the top one third is classified as ‘Large Acquirers’ and the bottom one third is 
classified as ‘Small Acquirers’4.    
 
The performance of all portfolios of acquiring firms is measured in terms of both the short-
run and long-run abnormal return’s (AR) generated by the M&A deal. The short-run analysis 
centres on a three-day event window (-1, +1) employing the Market Adjusted Abnormal 
Return approach (Seiler 2004; Brown and Warner, 1980; 1985) whilst the long-run share-
price affects are assessed using the size-adjusted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
approach of Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). The 
analyses aim to identify what the short-run market reactions were for acquiring firms, defined 
as the abnormal returns generated by the deal announcement. Moreover, the work then 
progresses to determine whether the short-run ARs transpire into long-run acquirer value. 
 
3.2.1. Short Term Analysis 
 
The short-run analysis is conducted as an event-study over a three-day announcement 
window (-1, +1)
5
. We calculate the normal returns of the firm using daily price data as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖 = ln (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
)                                     (1) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖  relates to the daily normal return of stock 𝑖 while 𝑃𝑡  and 𝑃𝑡−1 refer to the stock 
price on day 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 respectively.  
 
In determining the short-run announcement effects, we note the abundant methods available 
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Lyon et al., 1999; Brown and Warner, 1985). Due to the 
restrictions of models such as the CAPM (Roll, 1977), we follow the guidelines of Seiler 
(2004) and define abnormal returns as being anything earned by the firm that exceeds the 
systematic market compensation each day, such that the expected return of a stock is assumed 
to be the return earned by the market (Seiler, 2004: 220). This market adjusted AR approach 
                                                          
4 We also use a 15% and 20% cutoff level within robustness tests and the results are found to be consistent with our main 
findings.  
5 We also use (-2, +2) event window on the M&A announcement date within robustness tests and find the results to remain 
consistent with our main findings. 
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is in line with Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) so that AR’s are defined as the excess stock 
return earned by the firm adjusted for the market over the sample period (Buchheim et al., 
2001: 22). The normal stock returns (𝑅𝑖𝑡) must have the normal market return (𝑅𝑚𝑡) deducted 
in order to generate the AR for each of the three days as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡    (2) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑚𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
). 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the normal market return calculated using the daily price of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange over the sample period. The AR’s are then summated to give 
the Cumulative AR (CAR) for each firm as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=0    (3) 
 
This short-run univariate analysis will involve the above process for each portfolio. The 
portfolio t-statistics are computed using the formula: 
 
𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑇
𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑇)/√𝑛
                                   (4) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑇  refers to the sample mean, and 𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑇) is the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviation for the sample of n firms.  
 
3.2.2. Long Term Analysis 
 
In assessing long-term acquirer share price effects, Fama (1998) claims that the use of 
different methodological approaches in empirical research will lead to different conclusions 
being drawn such that the testing process itself, in effect, becomes a one over the choice of 
econometric model to use rather than a direct test of the study at hand. He further stresses that 
the assessment of various events using different models could often lead to eradication of the 
existence of an anomaly. As a consequence, choosing the correct model is therefore 
imperative.  
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To combat problems associated with long-run analysis and the noted bad-model problem 
(Fama, 1998), we employ the use of the twenty-four month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) approach. While the Calendar-Time Portfolio approach (CTPA) is a worthy 
alternative, upon its implementation we encountered a number of problems with the size of 
some of the portfolios due to a smaller number of deals within them and there was a question 
over our ability to reliably interpret such sample results. In this way, the long-run price 
effects are analysed in terms of the favoured BHAR approach of Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
and Buchheim et al. (2001).  
 
Size-adjusted twenty-four month BHARs are calculated following the methodological 
framework of Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), and Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). 
Specifically, size-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 − 1 − 𝑅𝑝𝑡                      (5) 
 
where Rpt relates to the reference portfolio return, calculated as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = ∑
∏ (1+𝑅𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 −1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1          (6) 
 
where Rjt is the simple return on firm j at time t and n is the number of firms. 
 
In each year, there are 50 reference portfolios (in terms of size and market-to-book). The 
reference portfolios are created in two stages following Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). 
First, in June of each year t from 2000 to 2009, we rank all Chinese firms listed in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges on the basis of their MV. Size deciles are then 
created on the basis of these rankings. Second, within each size decile, firms are sorted into 
quintiles based on their market-to-book ratios (MTBV) in December year t-1. We then drop 
firms with negative MTBV when calculating MTBV breakpoints
6
.  
The BHAR approach itself is well used within recent literature and is the advocated method 
for long-term return analysis (Lyon et al., 1999). Lyon et al. (1999) indicate that the BHAR 
method provides an accurate measure of the AR’s experienced by an investor. However, 
                                                          
6 We also calculated 12 month and 36 month BHARs for our sample in robustness tests and the results remain consistent 
with our main findings. 
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Fama (1998) posits that long-run BHAR’s suffer from compounding expected-returns. 
Furthermore, BHAR’s can produce a statistically significant result even when none is present 
due to the effect of short-run movements (Buchheim et al., 2001: 28). The possible positive-
skewness problem can yield potentially misleading results and thus may cast doubt over the 
efficiency of the output generated from statistical analysis.  
 
Therefore, we employ the use of a bootstrapped t-statistic as well as using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for estimating the differentials. These statistical methods have gained 
prominence within the literature as research has begun to criticise the potential skewed-
distribution problem of the BHAR approach (Barber and Lyon, 1997). BHAR’s do accurately 
reflect the effect of a particular corporate event upon the investor and their holdings 
(Buchheim et al., 2001: 28) and it is for this reason that they are utilized for assessing the 
robustness of the long-run performance of Chinese acquirers.  
 
3.3. Robustness Tests 
 
In order to ensure the reliability of the results produced, robustness checks for the short and 
long-run are also conducted. The short-run window has been expanded from three-days to 
five-days to further assess the financial announcement impact. The three-day CAR’s results 
are reported but it worth noting that we also find the results from a five-day event window to 
be very similar. Finally, the long-run window is also calculated for twelve months and thirty-
six months separately. Once again, we find that the results largely support our main findings 
although some coefficients lose their significance. For brevity these results are not reported 
but are available upon request. 
 
3.4. Multivariate Analysis 
 
In addition to the univariate analyses, a multivariate examination is specified so as to 
examine those variables that can help explain the variation in acquiring firm’s returns. As 
criticized by Draper and Paudyal (2008), the univariate analysis fails to allow for the 
interaction of alternative variables upon acquirer’s gains, and consequently we extend our 
analysis to model such interactions. The three-day CAR’s  (twenty-four month BHARs) at 
the date of announcement are investigated in the following multivariate framework:  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑖   (7) 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(+1,+24)  = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑖                           (8) 
 
In equations seven and eight, the constant reflects ‘everything after controlling for the effects 
of all the explanatory variables’ (Draper and Paudyal, 2008: 395). We follow a winsorization 
process whereby all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to minimize the 
influence of outliers. In this setting, we include a vector of explanatory variables, Xi. The 
main variable to be assessed relates to whether or not the target is Chinese. Therefore, we 
include a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the target is located outside of 
China, labeled as ‘Foreign’. Furthermore, when examining the performance of Chinese 
acquirers, it is necessary to control for the ownership status of the firm. The People’s 
Republic of China is strongly involved with the dynamics of the Chinese economy. Decisions 
to acquire abroad must pass through the state controls system, put in place to prevent any 
acquisitions of distressed international firms, which could cause financial difficulties for the 
acquirer. Furthermore, those firms that are owned by the government (State Owned 
Enterprises [SOE]), which proceed to perform domestic M&A’s, must also take guidance 
from the 25-member M&A committee. Chinese M&A legislation and government 
involvement for SOE firms means that the decision to merge could be considered more of a 
political rather than economic act. Additionally, recent research has shown there to be a 
positive influence attached to the performance firms that have state ownership within the 
Chinese economy (Zhou et al., 2012). For this reason, we include a dummy variable labeled 
‘SOE Bidder’ that takes the value of one if the bidder is a SOE.  
 
In addition, we include a series of control variables known within the literature to have a 
significant impact on the returns of the acquirer. Firstly, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) 
find that the size of the target relative to the acquirer can help explain a significant proportion 
of acquiring firm returns surrounding a merger. The premise behind this proposition is that 
the smaller a target is relative to a bidder, the lower the impact that will be felt in the bidder’s 
operations subsequently leading to a lower stock price impact. We control for this relative 
size difference between the bidder and the target by scaling the value of the deal relative to 
the acquiring firm’s market value, measured two months prior to the merger announcement 
date. This variable is included in the regressions and labeled ‘Relative Size’.  
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Travlos (1987) also writes that the use of equity in the payment method of M&A deals 
signals to the market that the acquirer is overvalued while full-cash payment would indicate 
potential undervaluation of the acquirer, both proposed under the asymmetric information 
framework of Myers and Majluf (1984). We therefore include two payment method dummy 
variables. The first is labeled ‘Stock’ and this variable takes the value of one if the bidder 
uses 100% equity to buy the target firm. In addition, we include a secondary payment method 
variable labeled ‘Cash’ which takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% cash financing 
to pay for the target.  
 
Recent literature emanating from the field of behavioral finance has also highlighted the 
importance of the valuation of the market at the time of the merger announcement. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) highlight the importance of 
the stock market in the M&A process. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) show that 
merger activity is significantly correlated with high market valuations. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) additionally argue that it is the stock-market which drives acquisitions through 
creating incentives to issue and use overvalued equity to purchase target firm assets. Finally 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) find evidence that indicates mergers conducted when the 
market is valued highly result in high announcement returns but poor long-term performance 
while the reverse is found for those conducted in low-valuation markets, suggesting that the 
quality of mergers is influenced by the valuation of the market at the time of deal 
announcement. Taking heed of this evidence, we control for the valuation of the market 
following the methodology of Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) whereby we detrend the 
price-to-earnings (PE) ratio of the Shanghai Stock exchange
7
 and classify the largest 25% PE 
corresponding months as being highly valued and the smallest 25% PE corresponding months 
as being valued low. Deals conducted in a high-valuation month take the value of one in a 
dummy variable labeled ‘High-Valuation Market’ while those that are conducted in a low-
valuation month take the value of one in a dummy variable labeled ‘Low-Valuation 
Market’.  
 
                                                          
7
 Since the Shanghai Stock Exchange does not directly report the P/E, we calculate the average P/E of all shares listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. The top and bottom 0.5% of observations (i.e. outliers) are removed in calculation. Subsequently, 
we de-trend the P/E in accordance with Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). 
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In a similar vein, related literature in the field of IPOs highlights the interrelationship 
between the states of the economic cycle with the activities of firms within it. In work 
conducted by Yung, Colak and Wang (2008), firms are influenced by whether the market is 
“hot” or “cold” in terms of the level of IPOs undertaken. We take note of this research and 
agree that the level of acquisitions within an economy at one period in time could plausibly 
impact the firm’s decision to acquire. Thus, we control for the impact of the level of 
corporate activity in the economy, specifically in relation to the number of M&As being 
undertaken. To measure the level of activity within the M&A market, we initially follow the 
method of Yung, Colak, and Wang (2008). Specifically, we compare the moving average 
with the historical average of the M&A activity in all previous quarters going back to 1995. 
However, since there are only a few deals before 2000, the moving average is always 50% 
(also true for a 60% cut-off) above the historical average. In other words, according to this 
method, nearly all the quarters are define as “hot” for China’s M&A market because of the 
growing trend. Therefore, we use another method to identify the M&A market heat. Adapting 
the intuition of Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009), we classify a quarter as “hot” (“cold”) if 
the number of M&A deals in the quarter is 10% above (below) the average number of deals 
over a two year window around the quarter (i.e. one year before to one year after the quarter). 
We then create a continuous variable labeled ‘Market Heat’, which is calculated as the 
moving average of the number of M&As announced in each quarter divided by the historic 
average of the M&As announced in all previous quarters spanning back until the onset of the 
sample period. 
It is also worth controlling for the currency appreciation experienced in the Chinese RMB. 
The People’s Republic of China exerts strict control via the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) over foreign exchange transactions such that the domestic currency is not 
freely convertible in international currency markets (Junnan and Yun, 2012). The tight 
control has been increasingly loosened over the past decade and looks set to continue in the 
same fashion. In this decade, the RMB has appreciated considerably and analysts are 
forecasting it will continue in the same fashion in the forthcoming years, with HSBC 
approved as the Chinese central bank’s market maker for direct trading of Chinese yuan and 
Japanese yen. We believe that the appreciation of the Chinese currency could also help 
explain the performance of acquiring firms in that if the firm is able to acquire cheaply 
abroad then this could work to the benefit of shareholders. For this reason, we include a 
variable that measures the appreciation of the Chinese currency relative to the global 
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benchmark of the US dollar, labeled ‘Currency Appreciation’. This dummy variable takes 
the value of one if the deal is conducted after the RMB exchange rate reform of 21
st
 July 
2005.  
 
We also include additional standard control variables such as the logarithm of the MV of the 
bidder (labeled ‘LN(MV)’) measured eight-weeks before the deal announcement to control 
for size effects; the MTBV (labeled ‘MTBV’) of the bidder measured eight-weeks before the 
deal announcement to control for valuation effects; the listing status of the target, which takes 
the value of one if the target was a publicly listed company, labeled ‘Public Target’; the 
experience of the bidder in mergers and acquisitions such that if the bidder has performed 3 
or more mergers before the acquisition in question, then they are classified as an experienced 
bidder, labeled ‘Experienced Bidder’; the run-up of the stock performance of the acquirer in 
the year before the announcement date over a window of (-364, -7), labeled ‘RUNUP’; as 
well as finally, the industry of the target, which takes the value of one if the target is situated 
in an industry other than that of the bidder, labeled ‘Diversifying’.  
 
3.5. Summary Statistics 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of both domestic and foreign acquisitions. Instantly, it 
can be seen that despite the volume of foreign deals in the sample being only 10% that of 
domestic ones as shown earlier also within Table 1C, the size of the target is considerably 
larger as measured by the MV of the acquirer eight-weeks before the announcement date. 
Thus despite foreign transactions being low in volume terms, the size of these transactions is 
economically significant. On average, acquirers of domestic Chinese targets have a market 
value of $1.2 billion while foreign acquirers have a mean MV of a staggering $22.74 billion. 
As a result, the relative size of the transactions is shown to be larger for domestic deals given 
the smaller average size of acquirers of domestic targets.  
 
Furthermore, the MTBV of foreign acquirers is shown to be much lower than that of 
domestic acquirers. Foreign acquirers have a MTBV of 2.83 while domestic ones have an 
extremely high value of 6.36. According to the existing literature, this infers that foreign 
acquirers have valuations typically closer to their fundamental level than those undertaking 
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M&A within Chinese borders. This is not surprising given the stringent controls SAFE places 
on foreign exchange as well as the M&A committee, in place to help encourage the success 
of international expansion.  
 
As noted earlier, the ownership status of Chinese firms is believed to be a significant factor 
influencing the returns of acquiring firms (Zhou et al., 2012). The summary statistics show 
that 144 targets of domestic acquirers are SOE firms. This provides support for the 
documented evidence that the People’s Republic of China is actively encouraging 
consolidation of domestic assets so as to improve the efficiency of the economy. 
 
Table 2 also shows that there is a high preference for cash financing in both sub-samples 
examined. 57% of domestic deals and 70% of foreign ones are paid for with 100% cash. The 
stronger preference for cash in international acquisitions is not surprising given the controlled 
nature of the Chinese domestic economy. The government has tight controls not only over the 
outflow of money from the economy but also over the inflow of investment. Furthermore, 
many Chinese companies as well as the government itself have built large cash reserves that 
are ripe for international investment. It was reported in 2009 that the state in Beijing had 
diverted $1.95trillion towards encouraging overseas oil investments (National Post’s 
Financial Port & FP Investing, 2009).  
 
We additionally include noted statistics from the existing literature, in particular the run-up of 
the acquirer’s stock performance prior to the announcement of the deal. It is plausible to 
suggest that there is information leakage around domestic transactions rather than cross-
border ones, given the higher level of information regarding both parties in domestic deals. 
The run-up variable indicates that there is a 5.94% increase in the acquirer’s stock price in the 
year before the acquisition rather for those purchasing domestic targets. Conversely, foreign 
acquirers experience a poor economic performance in the one-year prior to the acquisition 
with a -19.62% decline in their stock price. Acquiring abroad could possibly be motivated by 
a desire to improve the offering of the firm beyond that of the domestic economy.   
 
When we examine the announcement effect, we can see that the Chinese economy reacts 
much better towards acquisitions of domestic targets rather than foreign ones. Domestic 
acquirers see a 2.76% return on average when announcing their deal, whereas foreign 
acquirers experience losses of -0.58%. However, interestingly, while the market does not 
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respond well in the short-run, over the long-run it is shown that foreign acquisitions generate 
a 14.2% BHAR, relative to the long term losses of -7.98% generated by domestic acquirers. It 
is worth mentioning at this early stage that China’s heightened attention on ensuring foreign 
acquisitions provide benefits for the domestic economy do indeed lead to positive long-run 
market reactions. 
 
While the summary statistics indicate that we have included correctly all necessary controls, 
it is necessary for us to look in more depth at the performance of the portfolios under analysis 
– categorized according to size and value. The empirical results of this work will now be 
presented.    
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Short-Run Analysis 
 
Earlier in the work, we stated that the primary aim of this work is to examine the performance 
of foreign acquisitions relative to domestic ones. In our first hypothesis, we proposed that 
foreign acquisitions should outperform domestic ones given the results of the previous 
empirical evidence (Doukas and Travlos, 1987; Morck and Yeung, 1991; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005; Conn et al., 2005; Chen and Young, 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010). Table 3 
reports the short-run performance for the full samples.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
The results indicate that over a three-day event window, domestic acquisitions earn 2.76% 
(0.000) significant announcement returns. These positive returns hold regardless of the 
method of payment used. Cash acquirers earn 1.30% (0.000) announcement returns while 
equity is very positively received in the Chinese economy with 6.24% (0.000) bidding firm 
returns. This is in contrast to the evidence from the West, where stock acquisitions result in 
negative market reactions due to asymmetric information (Travlos, 1987).  
 
However, foreign acquisitions lose -0.58% (0.604), statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level. The returns remain insignificant when stratified according to method of 
payment. Despite these insignificant announcement returns, the two-sample t-test between the 
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two groups shows that domestic acquisitions statistically outperform foreign ones by 2.45% 
(0.006) on average refuting our first hypothesis that Chinese firms that acquire overseas earn 
better abnormal returns. The results of Table 3 indicate that acquisitions of domestic targets 
results in statistically significant higher announcement returns than those of foreign targets.  
 
Previous studies have found that the size of the acquirer is shown to have a significant impact 
on the performance of acquiring firms, where small acquirers should outperform large ones 
(Fama and French, 1992; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). Panel B of Table 3 reports 
the returns for small domestic and foreign acquirers. The results indicate that size plays an 
insignificant role in the returns to foreign acquisitions in the short-term. On average, small 
foreign acquirers lose -0.36% (0.853) around the announcement date, statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, small acquirers of domestic targets realize significant gains of 
3.58% (0.000) at the announcement, increasing to a significant 8.27% (0.003) when the deal 
is equity-financed. 21.58% of deals conducted by small domestic acquirers are financed with 
pure-equity whereas 50.36% are financed solely using cash. Despite the previous literature 
suggesting that the use of equity signals overvaluation of the bidder (Travlos, 1987), the 
Chinese economy does not receive such a signal and the use of equity, even in its small 
percentage, generates significantly high market returns. This suggests that the Chinese 
economy welcomes equity transactions of small firms. Again, the domestic sample 
outperforms the foreign one significantly by 3.93% (0.071) when the acquirer is classified as 
small, insinuating that smaller firms would reap better short-term price reactions by acquiring 
domestically.  
 
The results of Panel’s C and D indicate that these returns are significantly lower for large 
acquirers. Panel C of Table 3 shows the performance of large acquirers around the 
announcement of their deals, while Panel D conducts a two-sample statistical analysis 
between small versus large firms. There is no statistical difference between small and large 
acquirers in the short-run for either domestic or foreign acquirers as evidenced in Panel D.  
 
An interesting characteristic is the reaction to equity transactions. The existing literature 
related to firm size implies that small firms exhibit higher returns, and stronger price 
momentum relative to larger firms (Hong and Stein, 1997; Hong, Lim and Stein, 1998). One 
plausible reason is that small firms have a lower analyst coverage, which leads to a lag in the 
impounding of new information into their stock prices. Equally, alternative authors argue that 
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the root cause is the absence of liquidity in such firm, and barriers to arbitrage. While 
disagreement over the story behind this phenomenon continues on, the results are consistent 
in that small firms generate higher returns in Table 3.  
 
If we apply some of this line of thinking to merging firms, then smaller firms could plausibly 
see higher returns as the market does not have full information related to the firm, or is 
simply not following the firm enough to react quickly to its news announcements. This could 
arguably lead to a higher performance of equity-financed deals relative to larger acquirers. 
On the other hand, for large firms, the story would imply the opposite – there should be more 
market attention placed towards these firms, such that, in line with the previous literature, the 
signal of overvaluation emanating from the use of 100% equity should generate a downward 
market correction. Large firms should have lower barriers to arbitrage arguably and therefore 
their prices should be more in line with fundamentals. This is the intuition behind most 
Western findings. However, for large Chinese acquirers using equity there is a statistically 
significant positive market reaction of 5.13% (0.002). While it is recognized that only 
17.69% of large acquirers finance their deal using 100% equity, we still note the result to be a 
unique finding of the Chinese M&A corporate control arena. Yet we find insignificant 
announcement returns in the foreign sample for large firms. Furthermore, the sample 
disintegrates to virtually nothing when the method of payment is controlled for, with 90.48% 
of deals being financed using solely cash.  
 
Earlier, in the summary statistics (Table 2) we found that there is a preference for Chinese 
acquirers to purchase targets operating in resource-related sectors and this formed our second 
hypothesis. Table 4 presents acquirer performance based on the industry of the target.  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The results show that those firms acquiring within resource-related sectors generate 
significantly positive returns, particularly for domestic transactions. Acquirers of energy 
targets earn 3.78% (0.005) on average while also gaining 3.25% (0.000) if purchasing firms 
within the industrial sectors. It does appear however that these transactions are largely driven 
by the domestic sample especially given the smaller number of observations for the foreign 
one. Nevertheless, the choice of target industry is shown to be an important decision for 
Chinese acquirers to create shareholder value.  
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4.2. Long-Run Analysis 
 
The existing literature has highlighted the long-run underperformance of merging firms. 
Table 5 reports the long-term performance of Chinese bidders controlling for firm size over a 
twenty-four month holding period post-merger announcement.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The results of Table 5, Panel A indicate that overall, domestic acquisitions generate 
statistically significant long-term wealth losses of -7.98% (0.023) while foreign acquisitions 
generate insignificant returns of 14.20% (0.656). This performance for both samples is 
consistent for cash and mixed-method payments. However, while equity-financed domestic 
acquisitions earn significantly positive short-term returns, the market does not correct this 
positive upward price over the long-term. There are positive but insignificant returns for these 
companies. In relation to our first hypothesis, foreign acquisitions significantly underperform 
domestic ones when using cash by -18.01% (0.041).   
 
After controlling for firm size in Panels B (small acquirers) and C (large acquirers), the 
results show that small domestic acquirers have a much higher loss than larger ones - but this 
is statistically insignificant. In particular, cash-financed acquirers face losses of -20.98% 
(0.051) on average. For foreign acquisitions, Panel C reports that large firms generate long-
term wealth gains of 22.39% (0.014), while this increases to 25.33% (0.001) when the 
payment method is constrained to 100% cash (which represents 90.48% of the large cross-
border acquirer sample). This superior performance is also shown to be 29.81% (0.006) 
significantly higher than the performance of domestic large acquirers. This is the first result 
that supports our first hypothesis, indicating a financial benefit for Chinese firms of “going-
out” of the domestic market and is consistent with the reverse internalization view. Overall, 
the evidence in Table 5 suggests that large Chinese firms that “go-out” can generate 
significantly higher long-run returns relative to those which “stay-in”, so long as the firm is 
economically large.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
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While large firms can benefit from acquiring abroad over the long-term according to the size 
of the acquirer, the industry of the target is shown to lose its explanatory power in the twenty-
four months after the completion of the deal. Instead of the significant returns for acquirers of 
targets in resource-related sectors as in the short-run results of Table 4, Table 6 indicates that 
there are marginally significant losses for bidders of targets in the industrials sector to the 
level of -15.37% (0.061), while others show no statistical difference, but this is again driven 
by the domestic sample. This infers that the choice of target industry is not an explanatory 
factor for long-term value creation.    
 
Overall, the long-term results indicate that foreign acquisitions generate significant wealth 
gains if the acquiring company is large. The summary statistics showed earlier that foreign 
acquirers are significantly larger than their domestic counterparts while anecdotal evidence 
from the nineties noted that the Chinese economy went through a large period of domestic 
restructuring and consolidation (Ma and Hurd, 2005). This seems to have produced certain 
profits for these respective acquirers over the long-term.  
 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis  
 
While the univariate results have indicated that foreign acquisitions generate value only in the 
long-term for large firms, it is important to assess the cross-sectional relationships between 
the returns generated for acquiring Chinese firms and various known determinants 
highlighted within the existing literature. Earlier, in Section 3.1.4, we discussed the key 
variables to be assessed. These included various dummy variables to examine their influence 
on the performance of acquiring firms, defined according to key characteristics of the deals, 
such as whether the deal was foreign, whether the bidder had state-ownership and so forth. 
Table 7 presents the results of the short-term multivariate analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Models 1 to 3 of Table 7 show that there is a significant negative relation between the 
performance of the acquiring company and the dummy variable Foreign – which measures 
whether the target is domiciled outside of the Chinese economy. This adds a different 
dimension to the univariate findings, which largely indicated that foreign acquirers generated 
a statistically insignificant market reaction. Here, the results strongly indicate at the 5% level 
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of significance that the market reacts negatively to announcements of foreign acquisitions. 
Furthermore, this finding holds across all specifications reinforcing the significance of the 
relation. The results indicate that the Chinese economy is not welcoming of foreign 
acquisitions in the short-term period.  
 
In terms of the ownership status of the bidder, the results indicate that announcements of 
M&A deals by state owned firms, as measured in the dummy variable SOE Bidder, are 
positively received but this lacks statistical significance.  
 
One of the most interesting results of the paper has been the positive market returns afforded 
to Chinese bidders which use equity as the deal’s payment method. The univariate results 
indicated that Chinese acquirers that paid for their deal using 100% equity generated positive 
market reactions up to 8.27% (0.003) as shown in Table 3. The multivariate analysis however 
does not confirm this positive effect in the short-term period. Models 1 and 2 indicate that the 
use of 100% equity – as measured using the dummy variable Stock – leads to a insignificant 
positive market performance, while model 3 shows that the use of 100% cash – as measured 
using the dummy variable Cash – leads to a significantly negative acquiring firm return. This 
is in complete contrast to the US evidence, where the results found are the reverse – with 
stock financing being met with a negative market reaction due to the signaling of upward 
misvaluation.  
 
We include an additional number of control variables noted within the literature within our 
cross-sectional analyses. Yung, Colak and Wang (2008) highlighted the importance of 
controlling for the level of corporate activity within the chosen field. For this work, we took 
their recommendation, controlling for the level of activity within the M&A market. The 
results in Table 7 indicate that there is no statistical impact of the level of M&As within the 
economy upon an acquirer’s stock performance. The variable Market Heat is shown to be 
statistically insignificant across all models in Table 7 indicating that there is no effect on an 
acquirer’s performance within China by the macroeconomic level of M&As being initiated.   
 
While the level of M&A activity does not hold any explanatory power, the control variable 
Leverage indicates a statistically significant negative relationship. Ghosh and Jain (2000) 
find for the US that an increase in leverage around the merger announcement has a 
statistically positive impact upon the announcement period’s market-adjusted returns. Table 
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7, however, indicates the reverse for the Chinese economy - the higher a firm’s level of debt 
relative to total capital, the worse the performance of the acquirer. The Chinese economy 
therefore is shown to dislike acquisitions from levered firms.  
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
When we move to look at the impact of these variables in the long-term within Table 8, we 
find that the significance of these relationships changes over time. Foreign loses its 
significance across all models. Moreover, in model 1, Cash has a significantly positive effect. 
Table 8 also shows that the variables SOE Bidder, Relative Size and Stock exert a 
significantly positive influence on the performance of the acquiring firm in the twenty-four 
months post-merger announcement.  
 
While the size variable LN(MV) showed no significant effect over the short-term, the long-
term cross-sectional analysis indicates that there is a positive relation with the performance of 
the bidder. This indicates that the larger a firm is, the better it will perform in the long-run 
post-merger performance, in line with the superior returns found for large firms over the 
long-run period within the univariate analysis.  
 
In the long-run analysis of Table 8, we find that two additional control variables have a 
significant effect on the acquiring firm’s performance. The listing status of the target is 
shown in models 2 and 3 to have a positive and statistically significant impact when publicly 
listed across all models within the dummy variable Public Target. Furthermore, the variable 
Experienced Bidder is shown to have a statistically significant effect on the performance of 
acquiring company’s in the long-term period, across all models at a marginal significance 
level of 10%. This indicates that the more experienced a bidder is, the worse the long-term 
performance of the firm.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper investigates the performance of acquirers acquiring domestically relative to those 
that acquire abroad, specifically following the encouragement of the 1999 People’s Republic 
of China “Go Global” policy.  
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The results indicate that Chinese firms receive a better short-term market reaction when 
acquiring domestically with significantly positive returns while the cross-sectional regression 
analysis indicates that foreign deals negatively impact short-term returns. The results also 
show that larger a firm, the better its long-term performance, particularly when investing 
abroad. The results indicate that this consolidation and growth of Chinese multinationals is 
significantly improving the performance of foreign acquirers. Furthermore, those firms 
acquiring resource-related targets earn significant short-term profits around the 
announcement date but Western political concerns are at this stage unfounded given the low 
volume of currently completed foreign transactions.   
 
This work renders many further research opportunities in relation to cross-border transactions 
originating from China. In particular, we recommend research centered on areas highlighted 
for growth by the Chinese government, specifically acquisition’s within the energy and basic 
materials sectors. These undoubtedly will have long-term global effects, and research into the 
performance and efficiency of Chinese management of these scarce global resources is of 
undoubted economic interest. Finally, the political influence within these foreign transactions 
is irrefutably significant. We recommend that research into the political connections of these 
firms with the governments of foreign target is an interesting research field, open for further 
investigation.  
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Figure 1: 12-Month Moving Averages 
This figure reports the twelve-month moving average of acquirer market-adjusted three-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) for the full 
sample over the period 01/01/2000-31/12/2009. The full sample includes all completed deals that have bidder price data available on DataStream. The data 
requirements yield 1,055 observations. Extreme outliers (the largest and smallest 1% values) are omitted from the sample. The final sample includes 1,009 
observations.  
  
 
Note: The moving average of CARs reached its low around the RMB exchange rate reform of 2005, dated 21
st
 July 2005.  
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Table 1: Time Distribution of Deals 
This table reports the time-series distribution of the full sample. The domestic sample contains those deals where the target was a Chinese firm (Domestic) 
while the foreign sample relates to those deals where the target was located outside of China (Foreign). The figures shown represent the number of deals 
conducted within each category by year. All relates to the full sample studied. The Cash (Stock) sample contains those deals that are financed with 100% cash 
(stock). The Mixed sample contains the remaining deals that are financed using a mixture of cash and equity. Panel A reports the time distribution of the full 
sample by year (N) and deal value (Value), as measured in billions of dollars. Panel B reports the time-series distribution of deals by target nation for the 
cross-border sample. The figures shown in Panel B represent the number of acquisitions of targets from each nation by year. The countries are abbreviated as 
follows: Australia (AU); Canada (CA); Switzerland (CH); France (FR); Hong Kong (HK); Indonesia (ID); Japan (JP); Macau (MO); Netherlands (NL); 
Singapore (SG); Thailand (TH); Taiwan (TW); and United States (US). Finally, Panel C reports the time-series distribution of deals for the full sample 
stratified by the target industry. Panels C(i) and C(ii) refer to domestic and cross-border deals respectively. The figures shown in Panel C represent the 
number of acquisitions of targets within each sector by year. The industries are abbreviated as follows: CPS – Consumer Products and Services; CS – 
Consumer Staples; ENERGY – Energy and Power; FIN - Financials; GOVT – Government and Agencies; HEALTH – Healthcare; HI-TECH – High 
Technology; IND – Industrials; MAT – Materials; ENT – Media and Entertainment; PROP – Real Estate; RETAIL – Retail; and TELE – 
Telecommunications. 
 
Panel A: Time Distribution of Deals by Volume and Value 
Year 
All Cash Stock Mix 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
N Value N Value N Value N Value N Value N Value N Value N Value 
2000 4 0.346 0 - 3 0.036 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0.31 0 - 
2001 3 0.16 2 0.021 3 0.16 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 0.021 
2002 13 0.316 1 0.592 9 0.162 1 0.592 1 0.041 0 - 3 0.114 0 - 
2003 41 11.09 2 0.033 23 0.545 2 0.033 3 0.013 0 - 15 10.532 0 - 
2004 41 1.33 3 0.047 31 0.289 1 0.009 2 0.787 1 0.002 8 0.254 1 0.036 
2005 34 0.632 1 0.012 31 0.614 1 0.012 0 - 0 - 3 0.018 0 - 
2006 31 4.02 3 1.544 19 1.457 2 1.536 1 2.253 0 - 11 0.31 1 0.008 
2007 79 14.659 8 1.076 33 0.531 3 0.764 27 6.897 1 0.061 19 7.231 4 0.25 
2008 84 13.636 11 5.054 46 3.146 9 5.013 28 9.055 1 0.034 10 1.435 1 0.006 
2009 85 19.068 12 4.75 39 1.572 11 4.716 27 11.234 0 - 19 6.261 1 0.034 
Total 415 65.257 43 13.128 237 8.512 30 12.675 89 30.28 3 0.097 89 26.465 10 0.356 
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Panel B: Time Distribution of Targets by Nation 
Year AU CA CH FR HK ID JP MO NL SG TH TW US Total 
2001 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2003 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2004 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
2005 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2006 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
2007 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 8 
2008 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 11 
2009 1 1 0 1 4 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 12 
Total 3 1 1 2 22 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 4 43 
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Panel C: Time Distribution of Targets by Industry 
Year CPS CS ENERGY FIN GOVT HEALTH 
HI-
TECH 
IND MAT ENT PROP RETAIL TELE Total 
Panel C(i): Domestic 
2000 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
2002 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 2 13 
2003 1 3 6 1 0 6 8 3 7 0 3 1 2 41 
2004 3 2 6 2 0 9 3 5 4 1 2 1 3 41 
2005 1 1 3 1 0 7 3 10 3 1 2 1 1 34 
2006 1 2 6 4 0 2 2 2 3 4 5 0 0 31 
2007 2 3 10 4 1 8 8 15 10 1 13 3 1 79 
2008 4 4 5 3 0 6 17 11 20 3 8 2 1 84 
2009 5 3 12 11 0 3 12 14 5 3 14 2 1 85 
Total 17 20 48 27 5 41 55 63 56 13 47 11 12 415 
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Panel C: Time Distribution of Targets by Industry 
Year CPS CS ENERGY FIN GOVT HEALTH 
HI-
TECH 
IND MAT ENT PROP RETAIL TELE Total 
Panel C(ii): Foreign 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
2002 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
2004 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2006 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
2007 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 8 
2008 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 11 
2009 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 3 4 0 0 0 0 12 
Total 3 2 2 10 0 1 5 6 8 2 1 2 1 43 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample. The domestic sample contains those deals 
where the target was a Chinese firm (Domestic) while the foreign sample relates to those deals where 
the target was located outside of China (Foreign). The market value (MV) is the market value of the 
acquirer as measured two months before the announcement of the deal (in billions). The market to 
book value (MTBV) of the acquirer is measured two months prior to the deal announcement. The 
variable RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the announcement measured using 
the CAR [-364, -7]. The acquirer’s leverage, measured as the percentage of total debt to total capital, 
in annual terms, is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement (Leverage). Cash Flows/Total 
Assets is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement and is calculated as the Funds from 
Operations divided by the Total Assets of the firm (CF/TA). For additional variables noted in the 
literature, we consider the cases of acquisitions of publicly listed targets (Public Target); privately 
held targets (Private Target); Other targets relate to those targets not privately, publicly or state-
owned, i.e. subsidiaries and joint-ventures (Other Target); state-owned bidders (SOE Bidder); state-
owned targets (SOE Target); deals financed using 100% cash (Cash); 100% stock (Stock); a mixture 
of cash and stock (Mixed); the number of hostile deals in each sample (Number of Hostile Deals); the 
number of competed deals in each sample (Number of Competed Deals); the average number of deals 
conducted by each acquirer (Average Number of Acquirer Deals); the relative transaction value, 
calculated as the deal value divided by the market value of the bidder as measured two months prior 
to the deal announcement (Relative Transaction Value), and finally, the bidder’s 3-day cumulative 
announcement abnormal return (CAR (-1,+1)) and 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal return measured 
from the announcement date (BHAR (0, +24)). 
 
Statistic Domestic Foreign 
N 415 43 
MV $1.12 billion $22.74 billion 
MTBV 6.36 2.83 
RUNUP 5.94% -19.62% 
Leverage 29.10% 21.14% 
CF/TA 7.60% 17.56% 
Public Target 33 12 
Private Target 118 14 
Other Target  264 17 
SOE Bidder 60 7 
SOE Target 144 4 
Cash 237 30 
Stock 89 3 
Mixed 89 10 
Diversifying Deals 224 25 
Number of Hostile Deals 0 0 
Number of Competed Deals 0 0 
Average Number of Acquirer Deals 1.39 1.30 
Relative Transaction Value 48.96% 25.70% 
CAR (-1, +1) 2.76% -0.58% 
BHAR (0, +24) -7.98% 14.20% 
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Table 3: Acquirer Short-Term Performance by Size 
This table reports acquirer short-run 3 day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample. We measure the CAR using the formula 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 . The domestic sample contains those deals where the target was a Chinese firm (Domestic) while the foreign sample relates to those deals 
where the target was located outside of China (Foreign). Cash deals refer to those deals which were financed 100% using cash (Cash); stock deals refer to 
those which were financed 100% using equity (Stock); and Mixed deals refer to those deals which were financed using equity and cash (Mixed). Panel A 
relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates to small acquirers as measured as those firms in the lowest one third of bidders once ranked by their 
market value two months prior to the deal announcement (Small Acquirers); Panel C relates to larger acquirers as measured as those firms in the highest one 
third of bidders once ranked by their market value two months prior to the deal announcement (Large Acquirers); and Panel D relates to the differential 
performance between small and large bidders (i.e. Panel B – Panel C). The P-Value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for CARs and 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference between the sub-samples. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** 
and * respectively. 
 
Domestic Foreign Differential 
 
All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Mean 2.76%*** 
*** 
1.30%*** 
( 
6.24%*** 
 
3.17%*** 
 
-0.58% 
 
-0.57% 
 
3.77% 
 
-1.93% 
 
3.34%*** 
 
1.86%* 
 
2.47% 
 
5.10%* 
 
P-Value (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.604) 
 
(0.664) 
 
(0.635) 
 
(0.393) 
 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
(0.069) 
 
 
 
(0.605) 
 
 
 
(0.072) 
 
 
 
N 415 237 89 89 43 30 3 10     
Panel B: Small Acquirers 
Mean  3.58%*** 
 
1.50%** 
 
8.27%*** 
 
3.69%*** 
 
-0.36% 
 
-1.66% 
 
6.69% 
 
-1.84% 
 
3.93%** 
 
3.16% 
 
1.57% 
 
5.53% 
 
P-Value (0.000) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.853) 
 
(0.464) 
 
(0.643) 
 
(0.296) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.876) 
 
(0.102) 
 
N 139 70 30 39 12 4 2 6     
Panel C: Large Acquirers 
Mean 1.88%*** 
 
1.50%*** 
 
5.13%*** 
 
-0.09% 
 
0.82% 
 
0.57% 
 
-2.07% 
 
8.52% 
 
1.06% 
 
0.93% 
 
7.20% 
 
-8.61% 
 
P-Value (0.001) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.965) 
 
(0.459) 
 
(0.617) 
 
- -
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.425) (0.180) 
N 130 86 23 21 21 19 1 1     
Panel D: Differential Performance (Panel B – Panel C) 
Differential  1.69% 
 
0.00% 
 
3.14% 
 
3.78% 
 
-1.18% 
 
-2.23% 
 
8.76% 
 
-10.36% 
 
    
P-Value (0.428) 
 
(0.540) 
 
(0.369) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.349) 
 
(0.516) 
 
(1.000) (0.134) 
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Table 4: Acquirer Short-Term Performance by Industry 
This table reports the short-run acquirer 3 day (-1, +1) cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) stratified by the target industry for the full sample. 
We measure the CAR using the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 . Panel A reports the results for the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B reports the results for 
acquirers of domestic targets (Domestic); and Panel C reports the results for acquirers of foreign targets (Foreign). The industries are abbreviated as follows: 
CPS – Consumer Products and Services; STAPLES – Consumer Staples; ENERGY – Energy and Power; FIN = Financials; GOVT – Government and 
Agencies; HEALTH – Healthcare; HI-TECH – High Technology; IND – Industrials; MAT – Materials; ENT – Media and Entertainment; PROP – Real 
Estate; RETAIL – Retail; TELE – Telecommunications. The mean CAR is reported with the p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level 
and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
CPS CS ENERGY FIN GOVT HEALTH 
HI-
TECH 
IND MAT ENT PROP RETAIL TELE 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Mean 0.94% 2.53% 3.78%*** 2.19%* 4.03%*** 2.58%*** 0.95% 3.25%*** 2.21%*** 0.56% 2.46%* 4.42% 3.11% 
P-Value (0.500) (0.134) (0.005) (0.080) (0.000) (0.009) (0.403) (0.000) (0.003) (0.671) (0.064) (0.164) (0.360) 
N 20 22 50 37 5 42 60 69 64 15 48 13 13 
Panel B: Domestic Deals 
Mean 2.00% 3.17%* 3.74%*** 3.39%** 4.03%*** 2.66%*** 1.35% 3.54%*** 1.96%** 0.76% 2.14% 7.83%*** 3.64% 
P-Value (0.141) (0.078) (0.006) (0.034) (0.000) (0.009) (0.262) (0.000) (0.012) (0.616) (0.103) (0.006) (0.322) 
N 17 20 48 27 5 41 55 63 56 13 47 11 12 
Panel C: Foreign Deals 
Mean -5.05% -3.95% 4.64% -1.04% 
_
 -0.47% -3.41% 0.23% 3.93% -0.75% 17.35% -14.38% -3.21% 
P-Value (0.389) (0.445) (0.681) (0.520) 
_
 
_
 (0.367) (0.889) (0.164) (0.716) 
_
 
_
 
_
 
N 3 2 2 10 0 1 5 6 8 2 1 2 1 
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Table 5: Acquirer Long-Term Performance by Size 
This table reports the acquirer long-run 24 month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the full sample from the announcement date. We measure 
the buy-and-hold abnormal return using the formula 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=0 − ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=0 . The domestic sample contains those deals where the target 
was a Chinese firm (Domestic) while the foreign sample relates to those deals where the target was located outside of China (Foreign). Cash deals refer to 
those which were financed 100% using cash (Cash); stock deals refer to those which were financed 100% using equity (Stock); and mixed deals refer to those 
deals with known information confirming that the deal was financed using equity and cash (Mixed). Panel A reports the results for the full sample (Full 
Sample); Panel B reports the results of small acquirers, measured as the lowest one-third of bidders as ranked by their market value two months prior to the 
deal announcement (Small Acquirers); Panel C reports the results of large acquirers, measured as the highest one-third of bidders as ranked by their market 
value two months prior to the deal announcement (Large Acquirers); and Panel D reports the differential performance between small and large bidders (i.e. 
Panel B – Panel C). The P-Value is shown in parentheses calculated using the bootstrapping method while the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used for estimating 
the statistical difference between sub-samples. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
 
Domestic Foreign Differential 
 
All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: Overall Samples 
Mean -7.98%** 
 
 
-10.54%** 
 
9.08% 
 
-18.24%** 
 
14.20% 
 
7.47% 
 
-27.85% 
 
47.00% 
 
-22.18% 
 
-18.01%** 
 
36.93% 
 
-65.24% 
 
P-Value (0.026) 
 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.631) 
 
(0.682) 
 
(0.703) 
 
(0.827) 
 
(0.460) 
 
 
 
(0.041) 
 
 
 
(0.684) 
 
 
 
(0.246) 
 
 
 
N 415 237 89 89 43 30 3 10     
Panel B: Small Acquirers 
Mean -15.57%* -20.98%* 
 
6.73% 
 
-23.01% 
 
-7.62% 
 
-136.14% 
 
-40.46% 
 
89.02% 
 
-7.95%** 115.16%** 
 
47.19% -112.02% 
 
P-Value (0.053) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.693) 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.972) 
 
(0.168) 
 
- 
 
(0.923) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.586) 
 
(0.217) 
 
N 139 70 30 39 12 4 2 6     
Panel C: Large Acquirers 
Mean -7.42% 
 
-8.47% 
 
5.90% 
 
-17.70%* 
 
22.39%*** 
 
25.33%*** 
 
-2.63% 
 
-8.34% 
 
-29.81%*** 
 
-33.80%*** 
 
8.53% 
 
-9.37% 
 
P-Value (0.151) 
 
(0.254) 
 
(0.555) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.514) 
 
(0.813) 
 
N 130 86 23 21 21 19 1 1     
Panel D: Differential Performance (Panel B – Panel C) 
Differential -8.15% 
 
-12.51% 
 
0.83% 
 
-5.30% 
 
-30.01%*** 
 
-161.47%*** 
 
-37.84% 
 
97.35% 
 
    
P-Value (0.594) 
 
(0.817) 
 
(0.484) 
 
(0.871) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(1.000) 
 
(0.317) 
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Table 6: Acquirer Long-Term Performance by Industry 
 
This table reports the acquirer long-run 24-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the full sample from the announcement date stratified by the 
target industry. We measure the buy-and-hold abnormal return using the formula 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=0 − ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=0 . Panel A reports the results for 
the full samples while Panel B refers to acquirers of domestic targets (Domestic Deals) and Panel C to the acquirers of foreign targets outside of China 
(Foreign). The industries are abbreviated as follows: CPS – Consumer Products and Services; STAPLES – Consumer Staples; ENERGY – Energy and Power; 
FIN = Financials; GOVT – Government and Agencies; HEALTH – Healthcare; HI-TECH – High Technology; IND – Industrials; MAT – Materials; ENT – 
Media and Entertainment; PROP – Real Estate; RETAIL – Retail; TELE – Telecommunications. The mean BHAR is reported with the p-value in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
CPS STAPLES ENERGY FIN GOVT HEALTH 
HI-
TECH 
IND MAT ENT PROP RETAIL TELE 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
Mean -21.37%* -18.70% 1.00% 2.18% -19.24%*** -4.15% -8.50% -15.37%* -5.15% 24.55% -1.78% 10.08% 1.86% 
P-Value (0.083) (0.291) (0.924) (0.782) (0.001) (0.664) (0.506) (0.061) (0.622) (0.813) (0.801) (0.707) (0.956) 
N 20 22 50 37 5 42 60 69 64 15 48 13 13 
Panel B: Domestic Deals 
Mean -21.10% -22.19% 3.13% 0.91% -19.24%*** -4.88% -8.12% -15.31%* -0.81% -45.06% -3.21% 24.10% 5.86% 
P-Value (0.110) (0.223) (0.741) (0.932) (0.001) (0.618) (0.517) (0.064) (0.939) (0.122) (0.652) (0.415) (0.872) 
N 17 20 48 27 5 41 55 63 56 13 47 11 12 
Panel C: Foreign Deals 
Mean -22.92% 16.21% -49.92% 5.59% 
_
 25.92% -12.67% -15.94% -35.48% 477.00% 65.84% 67.07% -46.15% 
P-Value (0.636) 
_
 
_
 (0.602) 
_
 
_
 (0.931) (0.931) (0.207) 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
N 3 2 2 10 0 1 5 6 8 2 1 2 1 
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Table 7: Short-Run Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
 
This table reports the short-run results for the multivariate analysis of the full sample. In these 
models we regress acquirer 3 day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs (-1, +1)) 
against a vector of explanatory variables. These include the following dummy variables which take 
the value of one - if the target is foreign (Foreign); if the bidder was a state-owned enterprise (SOE 
Bidder); if the deal was financed using 100% stock (Stock); if the deal was financed using 100% 
cash (Cash); if the target was publicly listed (Public Target); if the bidder had conducted at least 3 
takeovers before the acquisition (Experienced Bidder); if the deal was conducted after RMB 
exchange rate reform from 21st July, 2005 (Currency Appreciation); if the bidder was in a high-
valuation market (High-Valuation Market) or in a low-valuation market (Low-Valuation Market); 
and finally, if the target was in a different industry to the bidder as measured using the first two 
digits of the four digit Primary SIC code of the two firms (Diversifying). We also include the 
following continuous variables: the acquirer’s market-to-book value (MTBV); the acquirer size 
(LN(MV)) measured two months prior to the announcement of the deal; the acquirer pre-
announcement stock performance as measured using the CAR over the window [-364, -7] (RUNUP); 
the acquirer’s leverage (Leverage), measured one year pre-announcement as the percentage of annual 
total debt to annual total capital; the acquirer’s Cash Flows/Total Assets (CF/TA) measured one year 
pre-announcement as the funds from operations divided by the total assets of the firm; the moving 
average MA(4) of the number of M&As announced in each quarter divided by the historic average of 
the M&As announced in all previous quarters spanning back until 1995 (Market Heat); finally, we 
include the relative size of the deal (Relative Size) measured two-months pre-announcement as the 
deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Bidder and target industry dummies and fixed-year effects are also controlled for but 
for brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Value shown in parentheses is adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% is denoted 
***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign -0.0273
*
 -0.0271
*
 -0.0286
**
 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.047) 
SOE Bidder 0.0153 0.0150 0.0151 
 (0.121) (0.128) (0.127) 
Stock 0.0099 0.0179  
 (0.489) (0.148)  
Cash -0.0129  -0.0169** 
 (0.143)  (0.027) 
Public Target 0.0166 0.0156 0.0175 
 (0.164) (0.185) (0.133) 
Experienced Bidder 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 
 (0.935) (0.959) (0.925) 
Currency Appreciation 0.0201 0.0158 0.0209 
 (0.556) (0.639) (0.543) 
High Valuation Markets 0.0018 0.0006 0.0017 
 (0.880) (0.961) (0.886) 
Low Valuation Markets -0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0035 
 (0.786) (0.854) (0.739) 
Market Heat 0.0287 0.0249 0.0296 
 (0.420) (0.482) (0.408) 
Diversifying 0.0018 0.0012 0.0024 
 (0.813) (0.875) (0.747) 
MTBV -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0010 
 (0.249) (0.326) (0.247) 
LN(MV) -0.0026 -0.0032 -0.0026 
 (0.382) (0.280) (0.388) 
RUNUP 0.0099 0.0104 0.0100 
 (0.218) (0.198) (0.218) 
Leverage -0.0429** -0.0431** -0.0429** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
CF/TA -0.0874 -0.0864 -0.0876 
 (0.143) (0.151) (0.139) 
Relative Size 0.0100** 0.0106** 0.0105** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) 
Constant 0.0920 0.1000 0.0893 
 (0.188) (0.147) (0.204) 
N 458 458 458 
R
2
 0.236 0.232 0.234 
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Table 8: Long-Run Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This table reports the long-run results for the multivariate analysis of the full sample. In these models 
we regress acquirer 24 month post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs (0, +24)) 
against a vector of explanatory variables. These include the following dummy variables which take 
the value of one - if the target is foreign (Foreign); if the bidder was a state-owned enterprise (SOE 
Bidder); if the deal was financed using 100% stock (Stock); if the deal was financed using 100% cash 
(Cash); if the target was publicly listed (Public Target); if the bidder had conducted at least 3 
takeovers before the acquisition (Experienced Bidder); if the deal was conducted after RMB exchange 
rate reform from 21st July, 2005 (Currency Appreciation); if the bidder was in a high-valuation 
market (High-Valuation Market) or in a low-valuation market (Low-Valuation Market); and finally, if 
the target was in a different industry to the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four 
digit Primary SIC code of the two firms (Diversifying). We also include the following continuous 
variables: the acquirer’s market-to-book value (MTBV); the acquirer size (LN(MV)) measured two 
months prior to the announcement of the deal; the acquirer pre-announcement stock performance as 
measured using the CAR over the window [-364, -7] (RUNUP); the acquirer’s leverage (Leverage), 
measured one year pre-announcement as the percentage of annual total debt to annual total capital; the 
acquirer’s Cash Flows/Total Assets (CF/TA) measured one year pre-announcement as the funds from 
operations divided by the total assets of the firm; the moving average MA(4) of the number of M&As 
announced in each quarter divided by the historic average of the M&As announced in all previous 
quarters spanning back until 1995 (Market Heat); finally, we include the relative size of the deal 
(Relative Size) measured two-months pre-announcement as the deal value divided by the acquirer’s 
market value. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Bidder and target 
industry dummies and fixed-year effects are also controlled for but for brevity, they are not reported 
in the table. The P-Value shown in parentheses is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder 
clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign 0.0637 0.0605 0.0289 
 (0.686) (0.703) (0.855) 
SOE Bidder 0.2240** 0.2280** 0.2170** 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.045) 
Stock 0.2650*** 0.1640*  
 (0.009) (0.075)  
Cash 0.1610*  0.0521 
 (0.081)  (0.529) 
Public Target 0.2590* 0.2710* 0.2840** 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.035) 
Experienced Bidder -0.1510* -0.1480* -0.1490* 
 (0.081) (0.088) (0.088) 
Currency Appreciation -0.0760 -0.0215 -0.0560 
 (0.877) (0.965) (0.909) 
High Valuation Markets -0.1270 -0.1120 -0.1290 
 (0.196) (0.249) (0.192) 
Low Valuation Markets -0.1590 -0.1710 -0.1770 
 (0.255) (0.228) (0.209) 
Market Heat 0.0157 0.0642 0.0382 
 (0.957) (0.831) (0.897) 
Diversifying -0.0965 -0.0891 -0.0787 
 (0.235) (0.266) (0.330) 
MTBV 0.0025 0.0009 0.0026 
 (0.719) (0.901) (0.712) 
LN(MV) 0.0924** 0.0996** 0.0928** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.022) 
RUNUP 0.0778 0.0712 0.0808 
 (0.242) (0.282) (0.226) 
Leverage 0.1650 0.1670 0.1660 
 (0.383) (0.376) (0.388) 
CF/TA -0.7990 -0.8110 -0.8050 
 (0.265) (0.263) (0.267) 
Relative Size 0.0759* 0.0683* 0.0884** 
 (0.058) (0.088) (0.032) 
Constant -1.3430** -1.4440 -1.4150** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) 
N 458 458 458 
R
2
 0.202 0.196 0.191 
 
